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I give an account of the structure of “oppressive double binds,” the double binds
that exist in virtue of oppression. I explain how these double binds both are a
product of and serve to reinforce oppressive structures. The central feature of
double binds, I argue, is that an agent’s own prudential good is bound up with
their ability to resist oppression; double binds are choice situations where no
matter what an agent does, they become a mechanism in their own oppression.
A consequence is that double binds constrain an individual’s agency while leav-
ing various dimensions of their autonomy fully intact.I
Imagine you are an untenured professor and the only woman and per-
son of color among the faculty in a philosophy department. You are fre-
quently approached by students, typically women or members of other
underrepresented groups, looking for mentorship and emotional sup-
port as they navigate their academic experience. While you believe this
service work is valuable with a view to increasing the representation of mi-
norities in philosophy, it is also emotionally draining and takes significant* This article originated with a talk I gave at Boston University about my experiences
as a junior faculty member, as part of their Annual Climate in Philosophy lecture series. I
gave versions of this article at the Action Network Meeting on Agency and Time, at the Phi-
losophy at the Border Conference at the University of Texas at El Paso, at the University of
Illinois at Chicago, at Wellesley, at the Society for Analytic Feminism Group session at the
American Philosophical Association, and at the Penn Normative Philosophy Group; I’m
grateful for the audiences in all these sessions. I’m especially grateful to Elizabeth Barnes,
Robin Dembroff, TomDougherty, Max Lewis, Daniel Singer, Jacob Stump, Alexander Tolbert,
Daniel Wodak, and Claudia Yau for help with revisions. Finally, I am indebted to the many
helpful comments from the two referees at Ethics.
Ethics 131 (July 2021): 643–669
© 2021 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2021/13104-0001$10.00
643
644 Ethics July 2021time away from your own research. You feel trapped. If you do this sort of
mentorship work, you help diversify the field in a way that will be better
for you and other members of underrepresented groups. Moreover, if you
refuse to do this work, you indirectly help tomaintain a status quo in which
women and people of color like yourself remain dramatically underrep-
resented and underserved. But by doing this service work, you compro-
mise your own research and reinforce a system where disproportionate
burdens are placed on women and people of color, making them less
likely to succeed in the profession.
Consider another scenario.1 You are a Black graduate student who
works on Africana thought with a view to expanding the traditional phil-
osophical canon. However, the status quo in academic philosophy is to
treat the topics and methods of Africana philosophy as marginal. You
are faced with a choice between doing the sort of work that fits within
the academic status quo and doing the sort of work that challenges that
status quo. If you do the former, you can garner recognition and an ef-
fective platform for your research. However, your research may not effec-
tively expand or challenge the canon, and it will reinforce the validity of
the standards of the academic status quo that have thus far marginalized
Africana thought. If you do the latter, you might not find a platform that
reaches its intended audience, and your research will, again, not effec-
tively expand or challenge the traditional canon.
These are examples of double binds. Double binds are ubiquitous
and not just within academic philosophy. A great deal of recent political
coverage has considered the various double binds facing female politi-
cians.2 There has also been renewed attention to the familiar double
bind faced by people protesting police violence against Blacks.3 Philoso-
phers have considered the double binds faced by trans women,4 queer1. I’mgrateful to Alexander Tolbert for discussion of this example. For a discussion of a
similar bind faced by feminist philosophers, see Katharine Jenkins, “‘That’s Not Philosophy’:
Feminism, Academia and the Double Bind,” Journal of Gender Studies 23 (2014): 262–74.
2. See, e.g., recent coverage of the “competence-charisma” double bind faced by Eliza-
bethWarren; Peter Beinart, “ElizabethWarrenHadCharisma, andThen SheRan for President,”
Atlantic, April 9, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/elizabeth-warrens
-charisma-didnt-suddenly-disappear/586690/. See also recent coverage of Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez “code-switching” in different environments; JohnMcWhorter, “ItWasn’t ‘Verbal Blackface.’
AOC Was Code-Switching,” Atlantic, April 9, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive
/2019/04/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-code-switches-black-english/586723/.
3. Protests that are peaceful and “law-abiding” fail to get headlines; protests that are dis-
ruptive or that involve the destruction of property are dismissed as disorderly and opportunistic.
See, e.g., Michael Mcbride et al., “Waiting for a Perfect Protest?,” New York Times, September 1,
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/opinion/civil-rights-protest-resistance.html.
4. See Talia Mae Bettcher, “Trapped in the Wrong Theory: Re-thinking Trans Oppres-
sion and Resistance,” Signs 39 (2014): 383–406; and Rachel McKinnon, “Stereotype Threat
and Attributional Ambiguity for Trans Women,” Hypatia 29 (2014): 857–72.
Hirji Oppressive Double Binds 645femmes,5 and those “passing as privileged.”6 Although a fair amount of
attention has been paid to particular cases of double binds found in op-
pressive contexts, little sustained attention has been given to the nature
of these double binds themselves. Such attention is warranted given the
central role double binds appear to play in oppression.
In this article, I give an account of the structure of “oppressive dou-
ble binds,” the double binds that exist in virtue of oppression. I explain
how these double binds both are a product of and serve to reinforce op-
pressive structures. In Section II, following Marilyn Frye’s influential dis-
cussion, I ask what it is about the double binds found in oppressive con-
texts thatmakes themdifferent fromother dilemmas or ordinary restrictions
on our options found in nonoppressive contexts. In Section III, I consider
and reject a number of proposals about the nature of double binds. I ar-
gue that double binds are not simply choice situations where there are no
good options, nor are they simply choice situations where one is forced
to choose between a morally best and a prudentially best option. In Sec-
tion IV, I identify what I take to be the central feature of double binds: be-
cause of the way an agent’s own prudential good is bound up with their
ability to resist oppression, double binds are choice situations where no
matter what an agent does, they become a mechanism in their own op-
pression. In Section V, I refine the picture to address cases where there
are multiple competing oppressive norms and cases where there are in-
tersecting oppressive norms. In Section VI, I consider the way in which
double binds are bad for the agents trapped in them. I reject two accounts
that locate the badness of double binds in the way they compromise an
agent’s autonomy. Instead, in Section VII, I argue that double binds limit
an individual’s agency by presenting them with an “imperfect choice”:
whatever an agent does necessarily undermines their own objective inter-
ests. I conclude, in Section VIII, by reflecting on the consequences of my
discussion for thinking about how we judge ourselves and others in the
context of imperfect choices.
There are three overarching goals in this article. The first is to vin-
dicate Frye’s central insight, that double binds are a powerful and perva-
sive mechanism of oppression, and that they are importantly distinct
from other kinds of dilemmas or limitations on our options found in
nonoppressive contexts. The second is to develop and refine the concept
of a double bind so that it can be useful in theorizing about oppression.
The third is to better understand what I call “imperfect choices”—choices5. Alice MacLachlan and Susanne Sreedhar, “Complicating Out: The Case of Queer
Femmes,” in Passing/Out: Sexual Identity Veiled and Revealed, ed. Kelby Harrison and Dennis
Cooley (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 43–74.
6. Daniel Silvermint, “Passing as Privileged,” Ergo 5 (2018): 1–43.
646 Ethics July 2021where, no matter what an agent does, they undermine the very interest at
stake in their choice. I argue that “imperfect choices” constrain our agency
while leaving various dimensions of our autonomy fully intact.
II
What, exactly, is a double bind? The term was originally developed by
psychologists in the 1950s to describe the sort of dysfunctional patterns
of communication within families that were hypothesized to cause schizo-
phrenia.7 It was theorized that schizophrenic symptoms were an expres-
sion of social interactions where an individual was routinely faced with
competing injunctions, with no way to respond to these injunctions. So,
for example, a mother communicates to her son both that he needs to
move out and become independent and that he could never survive living
on his own. The son cannot adequately respond to both injunctions, nor
can he ignore them. Inmore colloquial contexts, the term often gets used
to describe dilemmas or difficult choice situations. So, for example, we
might imagine someone describing a government health care policy that
puts health care professionals in a double bind. On the one hand, it says
that everyone must be treated within an hour of arriving at the hospital,
and on the other hand, it says that the most urgent cases need to be prior-
itized. Sometimes, it is not possible to carry about both instructions at the
same time.
These are not the sorts of double binds I am concerned with. In-
stead, I am interested in the sorts of double binds found in oppressive
contexts. I will refer to these “oppressive double binds” simply as “double
binds” throughout the article, but we might think of them as a subset of a
larger class of double binds.8 It seems to me implicit in much of the cur-
rent discussion of double binds, both in philosophy and in popular dis-
course, that the double binds found in oppressive contexts are different
from the sorts described above. Specifically, they are choice situations7. G. Bateson et al., “Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia,” Behavioral Science 1 (1956):
251–64.
8. See, e.g., P. Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization,” Social Theory and
Practice 17 (1991): 385–408; A. Cudd, Analyzing Oppression (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006); S. Killmister, Taking the Measure of Autonomy: A Four-Dimensional Theory of Self-Governance
(New York: Routledge, 2017); Marina Oshana, “HowMuch ShouldWe Value Autonomy?,” So-
cial Philosophy and Policy 20 (2003): 99–126; Marina Oshana, “Autonomy and the Question of
Authenticity,” Social Theory and Practice 33 (2007): 411–29; N. Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Fem-
inist Intuition,” in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social
Self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000),
94–111.
Hirji Oppressive Double Binds 647that are both products of andmechanisms of oppressive structures.9 This,
at any rate, is one of the central insights of Frye’s groundbreaking discus-
sion. Frye insists that although they might seem superficially the same,
the restrictions on one’s options in a double bind are unlike the ordinary
restrictions on our options that we might experience in nonoppressive









York:One of the most characteristic and ubiquitous features of the world
as experienced by oppressed people is the double bind—situations
in which options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose
one to penalty, censure or deprivation. For example, it is often a re-
quirement upon oppressed people that we smile and be cheerful. If
we comply, we signal our docility and our acquiescence in our situ-
ation. We need not, then, be taken note of. We acquiesce in being
made invisible, in our occupying no space. We participate in our
own erasure. On the other hand, anything but the sunniest counte-
nance exposes us to being perceived as mean, bitter, angry, or dan-
gerous. This means, at the least, that we may be found “difficult” or
unpleasant to work with, which is enough to cost one one’s liveli-
hood; at worst, being seen as mean, bitter, angry or dangerous has
been known to result in rape, arrest, beating and murder.10As Frye describes them, double binds are situations where one’s op-
tions are limited and all the options involve punishment or censure. How-
ever, she insists that double binds and other characteristic features of op-
pression cannot be understood in isolation from oppressive structures
more generally, or else they begin to look no different from the sorts of
limitation or unwelcome barriers that everyone faces:It seems to be the human condition that in one degree or another
we all suffer frustration and limitation, all encounter unwelcome
barriers, and all are damned andhurt in various ways. . . . If one is look-
ing for an excuse to dilute the word “oppression” one can use the fact
of social structure as an excuse to say that everyone is oppressed. . . .
From what I have already said here, it is clear that if one wants to de-
termine whether a particular suffering, harm, or limitation is part of. I want to remain as neutral as possible here about what oppression is. Frye’s analysis
es there being an institutional harm done to some social group, where this harm ben-
nother social group. Iris Marion Young argues that oppression should not be ana-
as a single unified phenomenon and that we cannot reduce all cases of oppression
e single kind of oppression. I do not here mean to characterize oppression in terms
uble binds; there can be oppressive circumstances without double binds (e.g., ones
volve outright coercion). Double binds simply offer us insight into one of the mech-
s of oppression more generally.
0. Marilyn Frye, “Oppression,” in The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (New
Crossing Press, 1983), 1–16.
1
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to tell whether it is an element in an oppressive structure: one has to
see if it is part of an enclosing structure of forces and barriers which
tends to the immobilization and reduction of a group or category of
people.11Frye understands oppression as a network of social barriers and forces
that serve to immobilize and reduce members of other groups on the ba-
sis of identity. Moreover, she argues, this network is constructed by, and
in service of, the interests of some group or groups. So, for Frye, a cis
man who is not a member of an oppressed group might feel frustrated
that certain career paths are female-coded and difficult for him to enter:
he might experience this as a barrier and restriction on his movement.
But, for Frye, this barrier is itself created and maintained by men, for the
benefit of men. To determine whether someone is oppressed or not, on
Frye’s view, it is not enough to know that there is some barrier or restric-
tion on movement, or that some encounter is painful or frustrating. In-
stead, we need to understand who constructs and maintains the barrier
or restriction, and whether that barrier exists in a network that serves to
immobilize or reduce some group, for the benefit of some other group.
Her account of oppression is powerfully illustrated with the meta-
phor of a bird cage:Cages. Consider a birdcage. If you look very closely at just one wire
in the cage, you cannot see the other wires. If your conception of
what is before you is determined by this myopic focus, you could
look at that one wire, up and down the length of it, and be unable
to see why a bird would not just fly around the wire at any time it
wanted to go somewhere. . . . There is no physical property of any
one wire, nothing that the closest scrutiny could discover, that will
reveal how a bird could be inhibited or harmed by it except in
the most accidental way. It is only when you step back, stop looking
at the wires one by one, microscopically, and take a macroscopic
view of the whole cage, that you can see why the bird does not go
anywhere; and then you will see it in a moment. . . . It is perfectly
obvious that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically
related barriers, no one of which would be the least hindrance to
its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are as confin-
ing as the solid walls of a dungeon.12What Frye’s metaphor effectively brings out is how mechanisms like dou-
ble binds can present the illusion of freedom. This is because these
mechanisms of oppression really do leave an agent free in one respect,1. Ibid., 2.
2. Ibid., 7–8.
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bird’smovement in any significant way. It is only the network of bars, taken
together, that limits the bird’s movement in every direction. So also, I will
argue, it is not the character of any one option in a double bind that reveals
how an agent in a double bind lacks freedom or the ability to determine
the course of their own life; we face restrictions on our options all the time,
andmany of our choices have consequences far worse than the ones an in-
dividual in a double bindmight face. Instead, it is only once we appreciate
how thedouble bindsfit intobroader oppressive structures that we seehow
these choice situations serve to mold, immobilize, and reduce members
of oppressed groups.
In this article, I seek to give an account of double binds that vindi-
cates Frye’s central insight that double binds are mechanisms that both
are a product of and serve to reinforce oppressive structures. I show how
the choice situation they present is different in kind from other kinds of
dilemmas or restrictions on our options. Before developing my positive
account in Section IV, I consider in the next section why other proposed
accounts of double binds are unsuccessful.
III
What, if anything, makes these double binds distinct from other kinds of
limitations or restrictions on our options that we find in nonoppressive
contexts? As Frye describes it, part of what characterizes double binds is
that the agents trapped in them have a choice, but that their choice has a
“damned if you do, damned if you don’t” character: whatever an agent
does, they seem doomed to bring about a negative outcome for them-
selves. We saw in the mentoring case that whatever the faculty member
does contributes to some degree to a system in which members of under-
represented groups are less likely to succeed in philosophy. And, in the
case of the Black graduate student, whatever the student chooses to do,
his research will not straightforwardly expand the canon. As Frye puts it,
the agent in a double bind “can only choose to risk one’s preferred form
and rate of annihilation.”13
It is not immediately obvious how double binds leave an agent damned
nomatter what they do. It is a mistake, for instance, to think that the choice
available to anagent in adoublebind ismeaningless or futile.Take theabove-
mentioned case of the faculty member who chooses to informally mentor
graduate students fromunderrepresentedgroups. It is true that this decision,
even as it aims to help diversify the discipline, carries with it a negative con-
sequence: the facultymember gives up timeandemotional energy that could
be devoted to her research and, moreover, perpetuates a system where the13. Ibid., 3.
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sented groups. But her options are not equivalent. Choosing to do this sort
of mentorship might well provide an enormous source of support and reas-
surance for these graduate students; it might play an important role in
some of them deciding to stay in the field at all. Despite the costs, we
might think that the balance of moral reasons lies in favor of the faculty
member undertaking this mentorship. It would be appropriate for her to
feel pride in her decision, and for others to praise or esteem her. So, al-
though double binds have a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t”
character, it is wrong to think that what makes the agent damned either
way is that her choices are both bad in the very same way and that, as a
result, her choice is meaningless.
Perhaps, instead, each option in a double bind “damns” the agent in
different respects. After all, double binds often seem to involve a choice be-
tween cooperating with and resisting some oppressive norm. Consider a
common typeof doublebind, a caseof passing as privileged: a transwoman
who chooses to pass as cis avoids immediate harm. One natural way to
think about this choice is as between cooperating with and resisting the
norm that trans women are not “real” women.14 By cooperating, the trans
woman is rewarded in the short term: she is able to avoid punishment or
correction. In general, she is granted some degree of power within the op-
pressive system in the form of some kind of prudential benefit. The trans
woman who chooses not to pass as cis performs an act of resistance against
the narrative that a trans woman is not a woman: by declaring her identity
as a woman, she openly rejects the prevailing attitude that gender is deter-
mined by genitalia or other biological features.
On this way of describing the agent’s options, it might seem as
though the choice in a double bind is between a prudentially best option
(cooperating in some oppressive norm in exchange for somemeasure of
power or security within the system) and a morally best option (resisting
an oppressive norm and incurring some punishment or sanction as a re-
sult). And, we might think, what an agent ought to do in a double bind is
a matter of weighing their prudential reasons against their moral ones.
In some cases, they ought to stand in defiance of an oppressive norm
even at some cost to their own well-being. In other cases, they will be jus-
tified or excused from such resistance because the prudential costs are
too high. But, in general, on this way of describing the choice situation,
the agent’s choice is between two competing values—what best promotes
their own prudential interests on the one hand, and what best promotes
their ability to resist oppression on the other hand. Although I do think
double binds generally involve a choice between cooperating in and resist-
ing someoppressive norm, I donot think what gives them their “damned if14. This picture will be complicated somewhat in Sec. V.
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choice between a morally best and a prudentially best option. After all,
we are often faced with choices between competing values, and many of
these involve choices between what is prudentially best and what is morally
best. The CEO who can engage in business practices that help destroy the
environment in order to get a substantial bonus might face such a choice,
but they are not thereby in anything like a double bind.
There is a deeper reason, however, that the double binds found in
oppressive contexts should not be characterized simply in terms of a choice
between amorally best and a prudentially best option.When an individual
is a member of an oppressed group, their prudential good is inmany ways
inextricably bound up with what is morally best for them to do with a view
to resisting oppression.Oppressive structures tend to incentivize complic-
ity with oppressive norms, but these oppressive structures and norms are
also what control an oppressed person’s access to various prudential goods.
As I’ll argue in what follows, the best prudential option comes with signif-
icant prudential costs, and the morally best option comes with significant
moral costs.
The relationship between an agent’s prudential good and the good
of resisting oppression is helpfully brought out in Silvermint’s discussion
of passing as privileged. Silvermint is interested in the question whether
a victimof oppression should pass as amember of amore privileged group
if they can. He argues that passing is at best “a structurally limited strategy,
one that relies on the net marginal advantage of protecting or promoting
some constituent of one’s well-being by endangering or undermining a
constituent of their well-being.”15 On Silvermint’s view, whether an agent
ought to pass depends onwhether thewell-being trade-offs theymake end
up being net advantageous; passing as privileged involves a self-regarding
complicity because, unlike genuine resistance, the agent is not trying to
change or escape the oppressive system that constrains their well-being.
Instead, passing victims “keep those constraints in place, and instead focus
on exploiting themanner in which they’re distributed so as to avoid being
constrained by them.”16
What Silvermint’s discussion reveals is that an oppressed person’s
prudential good is threatened so long as the oppressive system remains
intact. As we saw with the case of the trans woman in a transphobic soci-
ety, the agent faces significant prudential risks if they attempt to resist an
oppressive system. However, as Silvermint argues, the agent also faces sig-
nificant prudential costs by cooperating with such a system; they may ben-
efit in some respects, or in the short term, but only by reinforcing the very
oppressive system that controls their access to these goods in the long run.15. Silvermint, “Passing as Privileged,” 5.
16. Ibid., 39.
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pressive contexts, an agent’s prudential good is bound up with the moral
good of resisting oppression. The more power or security an oppressed
person has within an oppressive system, the more they are able to effec-
tively resist that system. Indeed, their own success or flourishing within
the system is itself a kind of resistance or challenge to an oppressive struc-
ture. If an agent resists the oppressive norm at operation in the double
bind, they are likely to face harm and punishment. And their resistance
to an oppressive structure becomes less likely to succeed the more harm
they face: the agent cannot effectively resist oppression if they cannot se-
cure their own life or safety, or more generally their ability to fully partic-
ipate within the system. The junior faculty member who takes up a signif-
icant amount of invisible and uncredited labor does so at the cost of her
professional success. And, without professional success, she is less likely to
be in a position to effectively remedy the underrepresentation of certain
groups within the field. Indeed, her failure is likely to reinforce the per-
ception that women are less able philosophers. The feminist academic
who resists the status quo cannot find an effective platform to advance
feminist aims; indeed, she reinforces the perception of feminist philoso-
phy as marginal. And the trans woman who resists the transphobic culture
by openly declaring her womanhood lives in the constant threat of being
silenced or erased. This silencing might happen through ridicule: she
may be dismissed asmake-believing or pretending. Alternatively, this silenc-
ing may take the form of bodily harm or murder. Her own erasuremakes it
impossible for her to effectively resist trans oppression. The upshot in all
these cases is that when the agent incurs a prudential cost as a result of re-
sisting an oppressive norm, this undermines to some degree themoral goal
they have of resisting oppression.
So far, I have rejected the view that double binds are choice situa-
tions where the options are bad in the same way and the view where dou-
ble binds force an agent to choose between what is prudentially best and
what is morally best. Instead, I have argued that, in oppressive contexts,
an oppressed person’s prudential good is often inextricably bound up
with the moral good of their resisting oppression. In the next section,
I argue that this relationship between an agent’s prudential good and
what is best for them to do morally is crucial to understanding the dis-
tinctive character of double binds.
IV
As a first pass, I propose that double binds are choice situations that arise
when a member of an oppressed group is forced to choose between
cooperating with and resisting some oppressive norm, and in which
whatever the agent does, they end up reinforcing to some degree the
Hirji Oppressive Double Binds 653oppressive structures in place. As we saw, when an agent cooperates with
an oppressive norm, they get some prudential benefit in the form of secu-
rity or power, or avoiding punishment, but they do so at the cost of rein-
forcing the oppressive structure that ultimately controls their access to
power. It might seem that, in some instances, an individual can cooperate
with an oppressive structure in such a way as to secure their own pruden-
tial good at the expense of othermembers of the same oppressed group: a
woman can, for example, be financially and professionally rewarded for
touting misogynist ideology on a conservative news channel. I think even
in these cases, however, there is a prudential cost to her decision. So long
as the oppressive structure remains inplace, thewoman’s financial or profes-
sional success remains precarious: she will be punished if she is ever per-
ceived to be stepping out of line. Moreover, her financial success is likely to
come along with other prudential costs: she is not free to speak her own
mind, she is alienated or criticized by other women, and so on.
If the agent resists the oppressive norm, they are likely to face harm
or punishment, and because their success or survival in the oppressive
system is itself a form of resistance, their being punished undermines
to some degree their goal of resisting the oppressive system. This is not
to say that their resistance is not, on balance, effective in working to dis-
mantle the oppressive system. I do not want to deny that there are good
moral reasons for members of oppressed groups to resist oppression,
and I do not want to deny that their efforts canmakemeaningful progress
toward dismantling oppression. But I am suggesting that in the case of
double binds, there is something necessarily self-undermining about the
character of the choice available to an agent: whatever they do, they are
forced to act against themselves, becoming a mechanism in their own
oppression.
Consider how this compares to someone who is not themselves a
member of an oppressed group but acts to resist an oppressive system.
Imagine a white male politician deciding whether to take a stand on the
mistreatment of asylum seekers at the border. Suppose that if he takes a
stand, resisting the oppressive system, he will lose significant support from
some part of the electorate he needs to win an upcoming election. The pol-
itician’s choice is not a double bind in the sense I have described above.
This is because he is not himself a victim of the relevant oppressive norm,
and as such, his own prudential good is not bound up with the good of
freedom from oppression in the same way. To be sure, these goods are
not entirely independent of each other; for example, the politician’s own
political success might help make his resistance to oppressionmore effec-
tive. But the politician’s own success or survival is not, on its own, a kind of
resistance to oppression. When his political career suffers as a result of
his resistance, his failure does not on its own constitute a setback to the
goal of dismantling oppression. And, conversely, if he cooperates in
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mately controls his own prudential interests. Instead, his choice is one
between two competing values: the moral good of resisting oppression
on the one hand, and the prudential good of his political success on the
other. It might be that there are prudential costs for him no matter what
he does. It might be challenging for him to determine the most effective
path for resistance. But, unlike in the case of a double bind, he is not inev-
itably forced to undermine the very good at stake in his choice, no matter
what he does; his choice does not have the same self-undermining charac-
ter we find in double binds.
One consequence of the view I have defended so far is that some of
the work in dismantling oppression might best be done by people who
are not themselves members of oppressed groups. The white male poli-
tician faces a difficult choice with real costs on either side. However, as I
will argue at more length in Sections VI and VII, double binds are unlike
other difficult choices agents are forced to make; double binds do not
simply force an individual to trade some valuable good against another.
Instead, they co-opt an individual’s very agency. In this respect, the white
malepolitician faces less severe costs to resisting anoppressive norm thana
member of the relevant oppressed group would. For this reason, wemight
think, he also has a heightened moral obligation to work to dismantle op-
pressive forces.
To recap: I have argued that the key to understanding double binds
is to appreciate how, when an agent is a member of an oppressed group,
the two goods at stake in their choice—their prudential good and their
resistance to oppression—are bound up together. If they cooperate, they
reinforce the very oppressive norm that in the long run controls their
access to security and power. If they resist, they are likely to face imme-
diate harm or sanction for stepping out of line, and in general to be
put into a position where their long-term ability to resist oppression is
undermined. On either option, they are forced to act against themselves,
becoming a tool or mechanism in their own oppression.
Some clarifications are in order. First, I have argued that, in a dou-
ble bind, an agent’s prudential good is bound up with the moral good of
resistance to oppression. Again, however, I want to be clear that this is
not incompatible with there being one option that is morally best and
one option that is prudentially best. The faculty member who chooses
to mentor students might be doing the morally best thing available to
her. Likewise, the trans woman who chooses to pass might be doing what
is prudentially best given her circumstances. What I am pointing out here
is that, because of the way the agent’s own prudential good and their free-
dom from oppression are bound up together, even when there is a
morally best option, this option will involve the agent cooperating in
their own oppression and the oppression of people like them, thereby
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which they are subject. This is consistent with thinking that the morally
best option ismore effective than the alternative at dismantling an oppres-
sive system, or morally preferable for some other reason. And even when
there is a prudentially best option, this option will involve the agent rein-
forcing to some degree the oppressive system that controls their access to
power.
Second, I have been treating double binds as choice situations in
which there are two options. This is true of the way in which double binds
are often described. Of course, however, the reality of these choice situa-
tions is more complicated. A junior female faculty member is not likely to
refuse any and all mentorship, nor is she likely to completely sacrifice her
career for the sake of this kind of service. Instead, she is likely to try to find
a compromise: to balance her support for these students against her own
professional success. Many double binds will involve not simply two op-
tions but a range of options which offer some compromise between coop-
eration with and resistance to some oppressive norm or norms. As we’ll
see in the next section, double binds can exist even when there are mul-
tiple intersecting oppressive norms, leaving no clear cooperation or resis-
tance option. Even when an agent chooses an option that is a compromise
between cooperation and resistance, they are in a situation where the two
goods at stake—their prudential interests and their resistance to oppres-
sion—are inextricably tied together. To the extent that they cooperate in
some oppressive norm, they reinforce the structure that controls their
prudential interests. To the extent that they resist some oppressive norm,
they invite the kind of sanction or punishment likely to make their resis-
tance less effective. Whatever they do, they end up being a tool in their
own oppression and in the oppression of people like them.
Third, it may well be that my account of double binds is not exhaus-
tive; theremight be choice situations—even ones in oppressive contexts—
that are naturally described as double binds but that do not fit themodel I
have offered. If so, I have simply described one pervasive and pernicious
type of double bind found in oppressive contexts. I’ll saymore about some
potentially difficult cases in the next section.V
The account I have defended so far needs to be refined somewhat in
order to accommodate certain kinds of double binds. Consider a familiar
example of a double bind, and one that Frye discusses: a woman is forced
to choose between being labeled a prude and being labeled a slut. As Frye
explains, if a heterosexual woman is sexually active, she “is open to cen-
sure and punishment for being loose, unprincipled or a whore.” If, on
656 Ethics July 2021the other hand, she refrains from sexual activity, “she is fairly constantly
harassed bymenwho try to persuade her into it and pressure her to ‘relax’
and ‘let herhair down’; she is threatenedwith labels like ‘frigid,’ ‘uptight,’
‘manhater,’ ‘bitch,’ and ‘cocktease.’”17
On its face, this sort of case does not seem to fit the structure I have
described. There is no option that clearly involves cooperation with an
oppressive norm, and no option that clearly counts as resistance to that
norm: this does not look like a choice between trying to achieve some
security or power within an oppressive system and resisting that system.
Instead, it looks like a case where there are two competing expectations
on what women should be like, and a woman is punished regardless, since
she cannot possiblymeet both expectations at once. Indeed, this looksmore
like the understandingof double binds at play in psychiatric contexts, where
an individual is faced with competing, mutually unsatisfiable injunctions.
In fact, I think there is a way to understand this case along the lines
of the account I have offered if we are careful in specifying the oppres-
sive norm at issue. The oppressive norm governing this bind is not the
expectation that women be chaste, or that women always be sexually avail-
able. Instead, it is that women not have sexual autonomy: the oppressive
norm in operation is that a woman not be in charge of her own sexual de-
cisions. Imagine a teenage girl being pressured into having sex with her
boyfriend for the first time. She is reluctant but afraid that if she does not
comply her boyfriend will break up with her, and that she might acquire
a reputation of being frigid, or a tease, or a lesbian. If she refuses sex with
her boyfriend and acquires such a reputation, shemay be unable to exercise
her sexual autonomy in the future; she will have been written off as sexually
undesirable or unavailable. If she complies, however, she reinforces a system
whereher sexual decisions are not hers tomake.Whatever she does, her sex-
ual autonomy is threatened. This double bind does not exist because her
boyfriend expects, at the same time, that she be both chaste and sexually
available. Instead, these expectations, when they are applied, are ways in
which a patriarchal society can exert control over a woman’s sexual choices.
Indeed, we can imagine a teenage girl who wants to have sex freely being
labeled a “slut,” for similar reasons. Her sexual autonomy is a threat that
needs to be controlled.
More generally, it is easier to see the structure of a double bind
when we look at particular cases, and when we specify the oppressive norm
at issue. Specifying the relevant oppressive norm becomes clearer when we
identify the prudential good or goods at issue (whether it be social capital,
political power, philosophical influence, or sexual autonomy), andwhenwe
identify the kind of punishment or correction that follows from a refusal to17. Frye, “Oppression,” 3.
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tion, bodily harm, refusal of access to certain goods, or the diminishment or
trivialization of one’s identity).
So far, I have been discussing cases where there is one oppressive norm
that governs the choice situation. Not all double binds are so simple. In
some cases of double binds, there will be multiple, intersecting oppressive
norms. Consider a case described by Rachel McKinnon of a trans woman
faced with a choice in her gender presentation:1
Stereotypes surrounding gender expression create a number of
problems for trans women. One particularly troubling result is that
some of the stereotypes of trans women conflict, which sometimes
manifests in double binds (Frye 1983). Consider a trans womanwith a
femme identity and gender expression who wears a dress and heels.
According to the pathetic and artificial stereotypes, her choice in
clothing doesn’t represent her authentic self (because of a commit-
ment to gender essentialism: she’s still really a boy), and so she may
be viewed negatively for wearing a dress. However, if she adopts a less
femininegender expression, peoplemay attribute her doing so toher
“real” gender: male. She thus can’t win: no matter what choice of
clothes she makes, she’s potentially subject to negative evaluations in
light of trans stereotypes (and gender essentialism).18For a trans woman to be read as a woman at all in certain communities, she
will need to present in an overtly feminine-coded way. However, given the
stereotypes about trans women as artificial or constructed, an overtly
femme presentation risks being dismissed as “trying too hard” or as “inau-
thentic.” If a trans woman does not present in an overly feminine-coded
way, her presentation is explained by her not being a “real” woman. In this
sort of case, part of what is going on is the intersection of an oppressive
norm faced by women in general and an oppressive norm faced by trans
women in particular. There is an expectation on all women in certain com-
munities to present in feminine-coded ways, and women are subject to dis-
approval or criticism if they fail to do so. But in the case of a trans woman,
layered on top of this norm is the transphobic view that womanhood is de-
termined solely by biological features, and that trans women are not real
women; any attempt that a trans woman makes to present in a feminine-
coded way is read as artifice or deception. Even a cis woman faced with a
choice between cooperating in and resisting gendered norms about pre-
sentation is in a double bind. But the bind a trans woman faces is signifi-
cantly more complex and more constraining. Because there are multiple
intersecting oppressive norms in operation, she does not have a simple8. McKinnon, “Stereotype Threat,” 865.
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thing she does is a kind of resistance insofar as simply being a trans woman
is a form of resistance in a community that denies womanhood to trans
women. Likewise, there is a sense in which anything she does, to some de-
gree, amounts to a kind of cooperation with an oppressive norm. By pre-
senting in an overtly feminine way, she inevitably reinforces norms about
what women ought to look like. But if she does not conform to these gen-
deredexpectations, she endsup reinforcing theperception that transwomen
are not “real”women. Because of the way in which oppressive norms inter-
sect for her, both of her options involve some measure of resistance and
some measure of cooperation.19
What McKinnon’s case brings out is the way that intersecting norms
complicate the model I described above for double binds, where one op-
tion involves resisting an oppressive norm and another option involves co-
operating in that same norm. However, what remains relevantly similar in
all these cases is the self-undermining character of the agent’s choice. Be-
cause of the way the individual’s prudential good is bound up with their
freedom from oppression, whatever they do reinforces to some degree
the oppressive structure that constrains their options. The agent is forced
to be a tool or mechanism in their own oppression.
VI
So far, I have given an account of howdouble binds are distinct fromother
kinds of dilemmas or restrictions on our options found in nonoppressive
contexts. I’ve argued that double binds are choice situations where an
agent is forced to choose between cooperatingwith and resisting someop-
pressive norm, and in which whatever they do, they end up reinforcing to
some degree the oppressive structures that constrain their options. In the
remaining sections, I want to explore how double binds both do and do
not make agents unfree.
One feature of my account is that an agent can be in a double bind
even if they are not coerced or manipulated in any clear way. Indeed,
many double binds involve a fully informed, rational agent freely choos-
ing among a range of distinct options. However, there still seems to be a
sense in which an agent in a double bind lacks an important dimension
of freedom. Indeed, this sense in which they lack freedom is built into
the very term “double bind.” It is also brought out powerfully in Frye’s
birdcage metaphor. I will argue that it is far from obvious in what sense
agents in a double bind lack freedom. In fact, I will argue, this is part of
what makes double binds so pernicious as a mechanism of oppression:19. Ibid.
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presenting them with the illusion that they are free.
It is natural to think that if the agent in a double bind lacks a dimen-
sion of freedom or the ability to determine the course of their own life, it
is because they are lacking some dimension of autonomy. In this section,
I consider two ways in which the agent might be lacking autonomy in
virtue of the double bind they are in. First, the agent might be lacking “re-
lational autonomy” insofar as they live under conditions of oppression;
theymight, for example, lack autonomy because they are coerced in some
broad sense in virtue of the double bind, despite not being under the will
or domination of another. Second, the agent in a double bind might lack
autonomy because they are forced to act against values or commitments
that are central to their identity. I argue that neither of these proposals
captures what is distinctively bad about double binds, and in the next sec-
tion I argue instead that double binds limit an individual’s freedom at the
level of their very agency.
It is notoriously difficult to specify the conditions under which an
agent is autonomous. There are all sorts of conditions under which our op-
tions are constrained by external forces, or where we are not fully in control
of ourselves or our lives. A successful account of autonomy has to explain
how circumstances like coercion, manipulation, and various forms of
pathological behavior limit autonomy in a way that other everyday circum-
stances, like a toothache, do not. A further difficulty, however, is that there
seems to be no one concept of autonomy under discussion; Arpaly de-
scribes “at least eight distinct things we sometimes call ‘autonomy,’” all
picking out different ways in which, wemight think, an individual’s ability
to determine the course of their life is constrained in some way.20
One notion of autonomy that might seem helpful in better under-
standing the kind of freedom that is limited by double binds is that of
relational autonomy. The concept of relational autonomy was developed
by feminists to capture the ways in which autonomy goes beyond a capac-
ity for self-determination, and instead is compatible with, or even requires,
standing in and valuing certain significant social relationships.21 For an
agent to have autonomy in this sense, certain social conditions need to be
in place.20. Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), chap. 4, 118.
21. See, e.g., J. Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibili-
ties,” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1 (1989): 7–36; Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie
Stoljar, eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Susan Brison, “Relational Autonomy and Free-
dom of Expression,” in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the
Social Self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), 280–99.
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tion of being self-directed, of having authority over one’s choices and ac-
tions where these are significant to the direction of one’s life. An auton-
omous agent sets goals for their life from a wide range of options, and
these goals are ones that they can hope to achieve through their actions;
these goals are formulated according to desires, values, and convictions
that they have developed in an uncoerced fashion.22 This sort of auton-
omy requires certain psychological capacities and dispositions, but it also
requires freedom from social or external impediments: “Manipulation
and intimidation carried out by others on the individual, unreasonable
conformist attitudes and role expectations, sexism, racism, or poverty might
all count as external or social impediments of the relevant sort. An autono-
mous person not only has the capacity for independent decision but also ex-
ercises it; the individual must not succumb to the well-intentioned ormalev-
olent attempts of others to control her decisions, nor must she be disposed
to impose impediments upon herself.”23 On Oshana’s view, an agent is only
autonomous if, in addition to certain psychological dispositions and capac-
ities, they also have access to genuine options in deciding how to live, as well
as substantive independence, including freedom from the domination of
others and freedom from the fear of reprisal for making one’s own choices.
Notice, however, that an account like Oshana’s is not yet helpful for
making sense of how an agent in a double bind lacks autonomy. Here it
is important to distinguish between local and global autonomy. We ask
about an agent’s local autonomy when we ask whether they were auton-
omous in some particular decision or behavior. We ask about an agent’s
global autonomy when we ask whether they meet some threshold of au-
tonomy in their life more generally. Oshana’s account is, explicitly, about
the conditions for global autonomy. That an agent in a double bind lives
in a patriarchal society and is always vulnerable to the domination bymen
explains why, globally, they might be lacking in autonomy; on this way of
thinking about autonomy all women lack global autonomy in a patriarchal
society. But it doesn’t seem to explain why, in virtue of the particular dou-
ble bind they find themself in, they are lacking in autonomy in some fur-
ther way. It does not yet explain the distinctive badness of double binds.
What we need is an explanation for how the double bind itself, in
virtue of the kinds of options it offers, limits an individual’s autonomy.
One possibility is suggested by Cudd’s account of “oppression by choice.”2422. Oshana, “How Much Should We Value Autonomy?”
23. Ibid., 102–3.
24. See Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, esp. chap. 5.
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nomic forces incentivize members of oppressed groups to make choices
that reinforce long-term economic disparities. So, for example, Cudd ar-
gues that various existing gender inequalities make it rational for women
to choose occupations with lower wages; doing so creates a vicious cycle
that reinforces the unjust division of labor and economic disparities for
women. Cudd argues that this co-opting of an agent’s choices is a kind
of coercion: she insists that we need an account of coercion that captures
the unjust ways in which social institutions advantage some groups at the
expense of others through the kinds of options available to members of
oppressed groups. Her account is meant to capture how an individual can
be free to act, and can be fully informed and acting rationally, and still lack
autonomy or the ability to determine the course of her own life in some
important sense; Cudd wants to show that the voluntariness of the choices
that individuals make under oppression does not somehow negate their
oppression. We might think that double binds are relevantly similar: as
I’ve argued, an agent in a double bind acts voluntarily, but no matter what
they do, they end up reinforcing to some degree their own oppression given
the options available.
This is not, I think, the right way to conceptualize the agent’s lack of
freedom in a double bind. For one, although cases of oppression by choice
bear similarity to double binds, there are also important differences be-
tween the cases under discussion here and those Cudd is interested in.
First, double binds exist in a much wider range of circumstances than
those created by economic pressures; there are a lot of ways in which an
oppressive structure can incentivize cooperation with oppressive norms
that go beyond economic benefits. The prudential goods in question can
range from bodily security to career opportunities to social goods like ac-
ceptance or recognition. But, second, in the case of double binds, even
choosing to resist an oppressive norm reinforces, to some degree, the op-
pressive structure in question. I’ve argued that in double binds an agent
is not choosing between two competing values. Instead, in double binds
there are two kinds of goods at stake—an individual’s prudential good
and their freedom from oppression—and neither can be secured inde-
pendently from the other. Cudd’s “oppression by choice” does not quite
capture the sense in which, no matter what an agent does, they end up
reinforcing the oppressive structure that limits their options.
These differences are important because they mean that double
binds are far more pervasive and wide-ranging than the cases of oppres-
sion by choice Cudd discusses. If double binds are instances of coercion,
then members of oppressed groups are in coercive situations every time
they are deciding whether to shave their legs or how to wear their hair. I
worry about expanding the concept of coercion to cover this wide a
range of cases. Given how important a role the concept of coercion plays
662 Ethics July 2021in debates around consent and paternalism, it seems to me better to lo-
cate an agent’s lack of freedom elsewhere rather than to expand the con-
cept of coercion to capture these cases.
A second way we might think that an agent is lacking freedom or au-
tonomy is not directly in virtue of their circumstances, but instead in virtue
of the way their circumstances affect something like their internal coher-
ence. Consider, for example, Suzy Killmister’s view of double bind and au-
tonomy.25 On Killmister’s view, there are four dimensions to autonomy,
one of which is self-unification. For Killmister, “self-unification” concerns
the extent to which an agent’s intentions and actions uphold commit-
ments that stem from their beliefs, values, and goals. Killmister argues that
double binds force an agent to uphold some of their values at the expense
of others, thereby constraining their autonomy along the dimension of
self-unification.26 Killmister does not explicitly offer an account of the
structure of double binds.However, she suggests that the “structure of this
dilemma is common enough” and that it arises because of the way an op-
pressive structure “creates disincentives for members of the oppressed
group, which give them reasons not to do that which society deems inap-
propriate for agents like this,” explaining that these reasons “function by
tapping into the agent’s own beliefs, values, and goals, even while they
push the agent to act in ways that conflict with other of her beliefs, values
and goals.”27 What her description suggests is that double binds arise in
oppressive circumstances where an agent is given a choice between coop-
erating with and resisting some oppressive norm, and where there are dis-
incentives for resisting and prudential reasons for cooperating. So far, this
is similar to the account I have offered. However, she goes on to explain
that the way oppressive structures give an agent reason to cooperate with
an oppressive system is by tapping into some of their beliefs and values,
while simultaneously forcing the agent to act against other of their beliefs
and values. The upshot is that, for Killmister, double binds put an agent in
a position where nomatter what they do, they end up acting against some
of their beliefs or values; this is the way in which double binds threaten an
agent’s self-unification. For Killmister, a woman who forms the intention
to shave her legs fails to uphold her commitment not to act on the basis of
patriarchal norms. However, if she forms the intention not to shave her
legs, she fails to uphold her commitment tomaintain a positive self-image.
She is unable to be fully self-unifying, and so her autonomy is reduced as a
result.
I think this is the wrong way to think about what makes double binds
distinctly bad because, in the first place, I do not think it is the right way25. Killmister, Taking the Measure of Autonomy, 148.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
Hirji Oppressive Double Binds 663to characterize double binds. Killmister’s view—that double binds force
an agent to act against some of her values and commitments—is not suf-
ficient to pick out double binds since many choice situations other than
double binds have this feature. Moreover, it does not even seem to be a
necessary feature of double binds that an individual act against some
of her values or commitments. Consider first how this feature is not suf-
ficient to characterize a double bind. Suppose I am choosing between a
job as a philosopher and a job as a community organizer. The former job
would allow me to realize my commitment to a life devoted to critical
reflection, as well as my commitment to maintaining a healthy work-life
balance. The latter job would allow me to realize my commitment to so-
cial justice and grassroots political organization. Suppose no job will al-
lowme to uphold all of my commitments. Whichever option I choose will
involve me falling short of upholding some central commitment I have.
On the sort of view Killmister suggests, this choice situation seems to com-
promise an agent’s self-unification in much the same way as a double
bind; in both, an agent is forced to uphold some of their values or com-
mitments at the expense of others. Onmy view, however, the way in which
I am forced to choose between two different values in selecting a job
does not capture the way a double bind forces an agent to act against
themselves.
To be sure, choosing between two different careers can be difficult
in all kinds of ways. Perhaps we do not have enough information to pre-
dict which career path will ultimately be more fulfilling. Perhaps, in-
stead, we are not in a position to make a rational choice because our rea-
sons run out; perhaps the values at stake are incommensurable, or the
alternatives are incomparable. Or, perhaps, the alternatives are “on a
par” in the sense defended by Ruth Chang: the options are comparable,
but neither is clearly better than the other, nor are they equally good.28
What an agent rationally ought to do in a difficult choice depends on
what the source of the difficulty in their choice situation is. They might
need to gather more information, they might need to stop deliberating
and flip a coin, or they might need to commit in Chang’s sense, throwing
their will behind one option, thereby making it the case that they have
most reason to choose this option.
Double binds are not merely difficult in the ways described above. I
agree with Killmister that double binds often do force us to act on some
of our values at the expense of others. But again, I argued in Section III that
it is a mistake to think of double binds as forcing us to choose between two
kinds of values, namely, broadly moral ones and broadly prudential ones.28. R. Chang, “Hard Choices,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2017):
1–21, 21.
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jobs is that whatever interest is at stake in our choice is undermined re-
gardless of what we do. Both options in a double bind undermine to some
degree our prudential interests, and both options undermine to some de-
gree the goal of resistance to oppression. Double binds do not simply
force an agent to choose one value at the expense of another. Instead, they
force an agent to undermine to some degree the very value promoted by
their choice. This is important for seeing why traditional strategies for re-
solving difficult orhard choices do not obviously help resolve the particular
kindofdifficultypresent indoublebinds.There isnoamountof information,
careful deliberation, or act of willing that can change the self-undermining
character of double binds.
I have argued that double binds are not merely difficult in the sense
of forcing us to act against some of our values or goals. They are also not
always difficult in this sense. A woman, on my account, is in a double
bind when she faces the choice of either shaving her legs, and so con-
forming to traditionally feminine standards of beauty, or not shaving her
legs and defying those standards. She is in this double bind even if she
has so internalized traditional norms of femininity that she experiences
no distress or frustration at this choice. Indeed, we might think, oppres-
sion is working best when victims of oppression are unaware of the sys-
tematic way in which their options are being constrained. The character
of her options is still necessarily self-undermining in the same way as the
cases above. Whether she is aware of it or not, and whether she cares or
not, there are still two kinds of goods at stake for her in her choice—her
own prudential interests and resistance to oppression—and they cannot
be realized independently of each other. If she cooperates, by shaving
her legs, she reinforces, however unwittingly, the oppressive system that
dictates certain standards of femininity. If she refuses, shemay be insulted,
or written off as unfeminine: she is treated as the exception that proves
the rule about what women should look like. Including this as a double
bind seems to me to be preferable to thinking that an agent can escape a
double bind by adapting her preferences in line with oppressive norms
in such a way that she no longer experiences a conflict between her core
commitments.
Although, like Killmister, I think that double binds force an agent
to act against herself in some important way, I do not think we can re-
duce this self-undermining character to features of an agent’s psychology.
Double binds force an agent to act against herself in a way that is deeper
than being forced to choose one value or commitment over another;
specifically, they force them to act against their own objective interests.
Moreover, double binds do not even require that an agent act against
some central value or commitment. Sometimes oppression is so internal-
ized that an agent can be in a double bind without experiencing any
Hirji Oppressive Double Binds 665inner conflict or frustration; they can act in line with their deeply held
values or commitments even as they act to undermine their own objec-
tive interests.
VII
What, if anything, makes double binds distinctively bad for the agents
trapped in them? Frye’s metaphor of the birdcage suggests that double
binds leave agents free in one sense and trapped in another. I argued in
the previous section that we should not think about an agent’s lack of
freedom in a double bind in terms of either an agent’s being coerced or
an agent’s being forced to act against some central value or commitment
they have. Instead, I want to suggest, double binds undermine something
like their very agency.
This is inevitably vague. I do not here intend to offer a conception
of agency. But, broadly speaking, an individual exercises their agencywhen
their behaviors exhibit the right kind of causal order, or when their behav-
iors are something that they do, as opposed to something that happens to
them.Agency is the capacity to act, and an individual exercises their agency
when they act intentionally, or for reasons, or in some other distinctively
human way.29 There is a clear sense in which, in a double bind, an individ-
ual is exercising their agency. Double binds give an agent a genuine
choice, one that they canmake in a fully informed and rational way. How-
ever, I want to suggest that there is still something defective or imperfect
about the character of the choice because of its self-undermining charac-
ter. They can pursue valuable ends but only in ways that undermine those
very same ends. This feature of double binds, I have argued, distinguishes
them from other kinds of choice situations where an agent simply faces
bad consequences no matter what they do. Double binds are not simply
cases where an agent chooses one bad outcomeover another. Instead, they
are cases in which whatever good an agent aims to realize in their choice is,
to some degree, undermined. Furthermore, the goods at stake—their own
prudential good and their resistance tooppression—are objective interests
they have.
However we describe what an individual is doing when they exercise
their agency in a double bind—whether they are acting intentionally, act-
ing on reasons, or throwing their will behind an action—there is, I am29. See G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957); D. Davidson,
“Actions, Reasons, and Causes” (1963), in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon,
1980); R. Audi, “Acting for Reasons,” Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 511–46; A. R. Mele and
P. K. Moser, “Intentional Action,” Noûs 28 (1994): 39–68; Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the
Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5–20.
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of a particular goal, they undermine to some degree that very same goal,
nomatter what they do. This is not to say they are not somehow the cause
of their action. Rather, it is to say that even when they cause their action in
the right kind of way, as an exercise of their agency, they are not fully ex-
pressing their agency because of the character of their choice.30 The
thought here is that the full expression of one’s agency might depend
on more than simply having the capacity for agency and not being inter-
fered with in exercising it: the full expression of agency might depend in
part on the character of the options available to an agent. So, for example,
if what makes an action properly agential is something about the way in
which an agent throws their will behind the action, there is, we might
think, something defective about the character of an agent’s will in a case
where they are forced to throw their will behind an action that under-
mines, to some degree, the goal they are hoping to achieve. There has
been a great deal of literature on how an individual’s material and social
circumstances might prevent them from developing their agency. I have
suggested that these same circumstances can prevent them from express-
ing that agency even once it has been developed.
Not only have I not defended any particular conception of agency,
but I have not yet said anything about the relationship between autonomy
and agency; agency is often treated as synonymous with, or a necessary
condition of, autonomy.However, the case of double binds shows that op-
pressive circumstances are not always autonomy depriving. Indeed, even
when oppressive circumstances like coercion limit an agent’s autonomy,
they may be bad in a still further way, insofar as they limit the full expres-
sion of agency. Plausibly, there are many more ways in which agency and
autonomy might come apart.
One might worry at this point that the difference between agency
and autonomy is merely terminological. After all, as we have seen, more
demanding accounts of autonomy may well include something like the
full expression of agency as a dimension of autonomy. I think, however,
that there are good reasons to avoid building the full expression of agency
into an account of autonomy. The more we restrict the conditions on30. There is a vast literature on the conditions for agency, but almost all of it focuses
on identifying the minimal conditions of agency. See, e.g., Anscombe, Intention; Davidson,
“Actions, Reasons, and Causes”; and Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will.” Notice that even
Velleman and Bratman, who are in search of the conditions on “human action par excel-
lence” or “full-blown agency,” are still talking about what makes something an agent does
an action or exercise of her agency, as opposed to the full expression of that agency; they
are still talking about how an agent ought to be related to her action, and not about how an
action is related to the external world. See D. Velleman, “What Happens When Someone
Acts?,” Mind 101 (1992): 461–81; M. E. Bratman, “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally
Extended Agency,” Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 35–61.
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risk shifting the meaning of autonomy away from its ordinary and phil-
osophical usage. Of course, this is not on its own a decisive objection:
sometimes it is philosophically and politically useful to revise concepts
with a view to best serving our purposes and aims.31 But the concept of
autonomy already has important political and philosophical uses in dis-
cussions about moral responsibility, consent, and paternalism. It is dif-
ficult to see how we can preserve the explanatory power of the concept
of autonomy in these debates while also accommodating the idea that
agents in double binds necessarily lack autonomy.
Some may be unmoved by this response. If so, what I have done in
this article is simply shed light on an undertheorized dimension of au-
tonomy. Ultimately, I am not so much interested in any terminological
disagreement as in the substantive difference between the concept of
self-determination or self-rule so often captured by accounts of autonomy
and the concept of an agent fully expressing their capacity to act. What
double binds reveal is that an agent can lack some important dimension
of freedom even when they are acting in a fully informed and rational
way, when they can select voluntarily from among a range of options, and
when they are acting in line with their own deeply held values or commit-
ments.32 Double binds force an agent to act against themself no matter
what they do or how they understand their own action. Althoughmuch re-
mains to be worked out, I believe that a more robust conception of agency
is ripe for further philosophical exploration.
VIII
To sum up: I have had three overarching goals of this article. The first
has been to vindicate Frye’s point that once we properly understand the
structure of double binds, we see how they differ from ordinary restric-
tions on an individual’s options and how they serve to immobilize and re-
ducemembers of certain groups. As Frye insists, understanding this differ-
ence betweenmechanisms of oppression and ordinary restrictions on our
options is a crucial part of identifying and challenging oppressive struc-
tures. The second goal has been to develop and refine the concept of a
double bind so that it can be useful in theorizing about oppression. I have
argued that double binds are choice situations in which a member of31. For a discussion of ameliorative projects, see S. Haslanger, “Gender and Race:
(What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?,” Noûs 34 (2000): 31–55.
32. This is not to say that an agent fares worse with respect to agency in a double bind
than they would in a case of a different sort of autonomy-limited choice situation like du-
ress or an irresistible offer. Instead, it is just to say that the way double binds constrain au-
tonomy is different from these other choice situations.
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resisting some oppressive norm, and because of the way their own pru-
dential good is bound up with their ability to resist oppression, they end
up to some degree reinforcing their own oppression no matter what
they do. The third goal has been to better understand what I call “im-
perfect choices”—choices where, no matter what an agent does, they
undermine the very interest at stake in their choice. I have argued that
“imperfect choices” constrain an individual’s agency while leaving var-
ious dimensions of their autonomy fully intact.
More generally, I have hoped to show that part of what makes dou-
ble binds so pernicious, and such an effective mechanism of oppressive
structures, is that they co-opt an individual’s agency while providing the
illusion of freedom. It is not always obvious when one is in a double bind,
and it is even less obvious what the choice structure is in such a bind.
One consequence of this illusion of freedom is that it becomes easy to
blame or criticize members of oppressed groups for acting in ways that
reinforce their own oppression. Indeed, it is also easy for a member of
an oppressed group to blame or criticize themselves for acting in ways
that make them complicit in their own oppression. Without an under-
standing of the structure of double binds, it is tempting to locate respon-
sibility at the level of individual agency, rather than at the level of the op-
pressive structures thatmake it impossible for an agent not to be complicit
in their own oppression.
Consider how common it is for members of oppressed groups to be
criticized for cooperating with oppressive norms. Individuals who code-
switch are accused of being inauthentic and of renouncing their mem-
bership in a particular community. Trans womenwho present in an overtly
feminine way are accused of reinforcing patriarchal norms. People who
spend a great deal of time andmoney to be thin are accused of promoting
a fatphobic culture.
Consider also how common it is for individuals to be criticized for
failing to cooperate with oppressive norms at the expense of their pru-
dential interests. Junior faculty of color are criticized for doing too much
service work, for using their time irresponsibly instead of focusing on
their research. Women in corporate settings are chastised for not dres-
sing in ways that make them seem both attractive and nonthreatening
to their male coworkers. Black protestors are accused of undermining
their cause when they protest in ways that are too “disruptive” or “angry.”
Many of these criticisms only seem warranted when we do not fully
appreciate the structure of the choice situation an agent is in. There is
no choice in a double bind that does not, to some degree, undermine
both the prudential good of the agent and resistance to the oppressive sys-
tem more generally. There is no survival or success strategy an individual
can take that does not, in the long run, compromise their own success or
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undermine an individual’s own ability to resist oppression. One lesson
here is that we need to be careful in the ways we criticize ourselves and oth-
ers for the imperfect choices we make in contexts where the only choices
available to us are imperfect ones.
